State of Utah v. Mark Edward McGrath : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
State of Utah v. Mark Edward McGrath : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mary C. Corporan, Kellie F. Williams; Corporan & Williams; attorneys for appellant.
J. Kevin Murphy; assistant attorney general; Jan Graham; attorney general; attorneys for appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. McGrath, No. 920492 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3473
UTAH 
DQCUivi£,\T 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS K F '~ 
50 
7TRJ 
_ _ _ . . , v r «rrcAL5 
BRIEF 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
MARK EDWARD McGRATH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
DOCKET NO. e\1£A°l2~-Ck 
Case No. 920492-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL BY DEFENDANT OF CONVICTION FOR THEFT BY 
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
408 (SUPP. 1993), § 76-6-412 (1990), ENTERED 
BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT, PRESIDING. 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
Attorneys for Appellee 
MARY C. CORPORAN 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS 
CORPORAN & WILLIAMS 
310 South Main, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUN16 89* 
S T A T E OF U T A H 
O F F I C E O F T H E A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L 
J A N G R A H A M 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CAROL CLAWSON 
Solicitor General 
REED RICHARDS 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
PALMER DEPAULIS 
Director of Public Policy & Communications 
July 12, 1994 
Marilyn Branch, Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. McGrath 
Court of Appeals No, 920492-CA 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, I wish to submit the following supplemental authorities 
in support of the State's position in the above-entitled case. At 
page 33 of the State's Brief of Appellee, arguing that evidence of 
a threat was properly admitted under Utah R. Evid. 404(b), see also 
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 278 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979 & Supp. 1991) n.5 
(Rule 404(b) permits evidence of threats as means to prove 
"consciousness of guilt;" citing cases); 2 Weinstein & Berger, 
Evidence % 404 [13] & nn. 2, 9 (Rule 404(b) permits "other acts" 
evidence to rebut defense theory of "unwitting" participation, and 
includes evidence of acts subsequent to crime on trial; citing 
cases) . 
Thank you for your attention. 
J. Kevin Murphy 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellee 
cc: Mary C. Corporan 
Kellie F. Williams 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
MARK EDWARD McGRATH, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 920492-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL BY DEFENDANT OF CONVICTION FOR THEFT BY 
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
408 (SUPP. 1993), § 76-6-412 (1990), ENTERED 
BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT, PRESIDING. 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
Attorneys for Appellee 
MARY C. CORPORAN 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS 
CORPORAN & WILLIAMS 
310 South Main, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED MCGRATH'S 
STATUTORY "SPEEDY DISPOSITION"-BASED MOTION TO 
DISMISS 11 
A. Procedural Background 12 
B. Because McGrath's Request for Disposition Was 
Premature, the "Speedy Disposition" Statute 
Was Not Triggered 13 
POINT II THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
GUILTY VERDICT FOR THEFT BY RECEIVING 17 
A. McGrath Has Not Properly Briefed this Point . . 17 
B. McGrath's Argument Also Fails on its Merits . . 18 
POINT III MCGRATH HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED "PLAIN ERROR" TO 
SUPPORT HIS APPELLATE ASSERTION OF 
"PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 19 
A. The Prosecutor Advanced No Obviously Improper 
"Aiding and Abetting" Case 21 
B. The Prosecutor Made No Obviously Improper Use 
of Impeachment Evidence 23 
i 
POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MCGRATH'S 
MISTRIAL MOTION, AGAINST HIS CONTENTION THAT 
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE WAS REVIEWED DURING JURY 
DELIBERATIONS 26 
A. Procedural Background 26 
B. The Mistrial Motion Was Properly Denied . . . . 27 
POINT V MCGRATH HAS NOT PROVEN THAT HE WAS 
INEFFECTIVELY ASSISTED BY TRIAL COUNSEL . . . . 28 
A. McGrath's Allegation that Counsel Improperly-
Prevented Him from Testifying in His Own 
Defense is Unsupported by Record Evidence . . . 29 
B. McGrath's Argument that Trial Counsel 
Improperly Failed to Object to Certain 
Evidence is Not Properly Briefed on Appeal. . .30 
POINT VI EVIDENCE OF MCGRATH'S THREAT AGAINST A STATE'S 
WITNESS WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 31 
POINT VII THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN ITS INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY DEFINING THEFT 
BY RECEIVING 33 
CONCLUSION 35 
APPENDICES 
Appendix I 
Appendix II 
Appendix III 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Bambrouah v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976) 3, 23, 32 
Di Carlo v. United States. 6 F.2d 364 (2nd Cir. 1925) 25 
Parsons v. Barnes. P.2d , 23 0 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 (Utah 1994) 3, 28 
State v. Ami-cone. 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) 18 
State v. Bingham. 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984) 29 
State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) 18 
State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1993), pet, for 
cert, filed. No. 940146, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 71 
(Utah March 22, 1994) 5, 6, 22 
State v. Clark. 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d 274 (1972) 14 
State v. Cook. 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) 29 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 2, 4, 20 
State v. Farnsworth. 30 Utah 2d 435, 519 P.2d 244 (1974)... 14, 15 
State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) 18 
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992) 3, 23, 32 
State v. Maurer. 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989) 33 
State v. Moore. 521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974) 14 
State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990) 17 
State v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) 3, 32 
State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991) 1, 12, 13 
State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992) 18 
State v. Ramsev. 782 P.2d 480 (Utah 1989) 24 
iii 
State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) 22 
State v. Smith. 699 P.2d 711 (Utah 1985) 15 
State v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988) 2, 26 
State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 28 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 19 
State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982), 
cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1044 (1983) 29 
State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992) 18 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 3, 28, 31 
State v. Wright. 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987) 14, 15 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (Supp. 1993) 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1993) 1, 2, 18, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1990) 1, 4, 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11 (1990) 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990) 3, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 1973) 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1993) 1, 2 
Utah R. App. P. 23 29 
Utah R. App. P. 24 18 
Utah R. Evid. 401 1, 21, 32 
Utah R. Evid. 402 21, 32 
Utah R. Evid. 403 21, 33 
Utah R. Evid. 606 28 
Utah R. Evid. 613 24, 27 
Utah R. Evid. 801 24, 27 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920492-CA 
v. : 
MARK EDWARD McGRATH, ; Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant-Appellant Mark Edward McGrath (McGrath) 
appeals his conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, a 
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 
(Supp. 1993), 76-6-412(1) (1990), upon jury trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding. This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1993) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
McGrath presents seven issues for appellate review. 
The State reframes those issues slightly, as follows: 
1. Did the Trial Court Properly Reject McGrath's 
Pretrial Motion to Dismiss, Which Was Based Upon a State "Speedy 
Disposition" Statute for Charges Brought Against a Defendant Who 
is Already Incarcerated? As framed in this case, this question 
is one of statutory interpretation, reviewed without deference to 
the trial court's judgment. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 
(Utah 1991) . 
2. Does McGrath's Challenge to the Sufficiency of the 
Evidence Supporting the Guilty Verdict Fail for Lack of Proper 
Appellate Analysis? By its nature, this is a question considered 
de novo by the appellate court. A jury verdict will be set aside 
on appeal only if the evidence, viewed favorably to the verdict, 
is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a reasonable 
doubt must have been entertained of the defendant's guilt. State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993). 
3. Should McGrath's Claim of "Extensive and Pervasive 
Prosecutorial Misconduct," to Which No Objection Was Raised at 
Trial, be Rejected for His Failure to Prove "Plain Error"? 
Because no "prosecutor misconduct" argument was made at trial, a 
high barrier must be crossed to permit its consideration on 
appeal: besides proving error, the appellant must prove that 
such error was both obvious and prejudicial to his or her cause. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
4. Did the Trial Court Properly Deny McGrath's 
Mistrial Motion, Against His Argument that the Jury Had Been 
Exposed to Non-Record Evidence During its Early Deliberations? A 
trial court's decision to deny a mistrial motion is deferentially 
reviewed, reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988). 
5. Should McGrath's "Counsel Ineffectiveness11 
Arguments be Rejected for Lack of Record Support, and Because 
They Otherwise Are Not Properly Analyzed on Appeal? As with 
Issue Two, above, this is a question reviewed de novo by the 
2 
appellate court. In the interest of the finality of criminal 
judgments, a "counsel ineffectiveness" argument, like one of 
"plain error," poses a high barrier for the complaining 
defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 
(1984); Parsons v. Barnes, P.2d , , 230 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 5-6 (Utah 1994). 
6. Did the Trial Court Properly Overrule McGrath's 
Objection to Testimony that After His Arrest, McGrath Threatened 
an Important Prosecution Witness? As a question of evidentiary 
relevance and unfair prejudice under Rules 401-404, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, it is reviewed on appeal with deference to the trial 
court. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976); 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). Cf. State 
v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 698-99 & nn. 4, 5 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
7. Did the Trial Court Properly Remedy its Initially 
Flawed Jury Instruction on the Elements of the Offense, thereby 
Preventing Reversible Error? Because defense counsel acquiesced 
in the remedy provided by the trial court, appellate review of 
this question should be conducted under the "plain error" 
standard of State v. Dunn, described in Issue Three, above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The statutory "speedy disposition" rule, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-29-1 (1990), is copied in appendix I of this brief and is 
also set forth in McGrath's Brief of Appellant at 13-14. A 
criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel, U.S. CONST. 
3 
AMEND. VI, is familiar. Other pertinent provisions will be cited 
and set forth as necessary in the main text of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While on parole for prior felonies, McGrath was 
arrested for suspected involvement in a robbery and theft, as 
well as violation of his parole terms, and returned to the Utah 
State Prison. Eventually he was charged by information with 
aggravated robbery or, in the alternative, theft by receiving 
stolen property, as well as possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. After a preliminary hearing, the first and 
last of these charges were dismissed (R. 8-11). 
Upon jury trial, McGrath was found guilty of theft by 
receiving, a second degree felony owing to the finding that the 
stolen property was valued at over one thousand dollars, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (a) (i) (1990) (R. 233). Accordingly, he 
was sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State 
Prison, to be served concurrently with the sentences for his 
prior felony convictions (R. 241). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Consistent with settled appellate practice, e.g., State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993), the State recites the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. On the 
morning of January 29, 1991, Stephanie Vert was robbed at 
gunpoint, by a person identified as Cory Brooks, in the West 
Valley City home that she shared with her mother, Martha Vert (R. 
430, 436, 439) . From the Vert home, Brooks stole jewelry valued 
4 
around six to seven thousand dollars, including a distinctive 
"marquise" diamond ring (R. 432-33) -1 While completing the 
crime, Brooks spoke by walkie-talkie with an accomplice, 
arranging to be picked up outside the home (R. 437). 
That evening, McGrath drove Brooks to visit Rodney 
Langenbacker at Langenbacker's home. There Brooks displayed and 
offered to sell a collection of jewelry, including a marquise 
diamond ring (R. 444-47, 467). Rodney Langenbacker later drew 
pictures of several of the items displayed by Brooks, which 
matched items on a list drawn up by the Verts of the jewelry 
stolen during the robbery (R. 446-47). 
Rodney Langenbacker's brother, Curtis, came to the home 
and also viewed the jewelry in Brooks' possession (R. 464, 472). 
Curtis, who described himself as a jeweler, took the marquise 
diamond ring and departed, believing that he had a buyer for it 
(R. 465, 469, 472-74). Curtis was unable to sell the ring, 
however, and later returned it to Brooks, again riding in a car 
driven by McGrath, at another location (R. 483-84) . 
McGrath was a relatively passive participant in the 
Langenbacker visit, remaining outside in his truck during much of 
the time; he did not openly discuss the jewelry (R. 451, 467). 
He did enter the Langenbacker home for a few minutes to mumble 
brooks was separately tried and convicted of aggravated 
robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person for the Vert robbery; those convictions were 
affirmed by this Court in State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818 (Utah 
App.), petition for cert, filed, No. 940146, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 71 
(Utah March 22, 1994). 
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something to Brooks. According to Rodney Langenbacker's wife, 
McGrath then asked her for directions to another address, and 
departed (R. 452, 462). At McGrath's trial, Mr. and Mrs. 
Langenbacker were shown a photograph of, and readily identified, 
the truck driven by McGrath that evening (R. 44 6, 4 60).2 
During Brooks' and McGrath's visit, the Langenbackers 
heard a news broadcast about the Vert robbery (R. 444-45, 461). 
This caused them to suspect that Brooks and McGrath had been 
involved in the robbery (R. 451, 463). When Brooks departed the 
next morning after an overnight stay with the Langenbackers, Mrs. 
Langenbacker called the police to report that suspicion (R. 455-
56, 464). When the police came to their home, the Langenbackers 
gave them a necklace, left behind from the collection displayed 
by Brooks (R. 458, 462-63) . Martha Vert identified the necklace 
as one of the items stolen in the Vert robbery (R. 431, 434). 
Mrs. Langenbacker identified McGrath from a photo array 
provided by police during the robbery investigation (R. 470). A 
couple of days later, having evidently learned of her call to the 
police, McGrath telephoned Mrs. Langenbacker and threatened her, 
2A neighbor also testified at McGrath's trial that he observed 
a similar truck in the Vert neighborhood on the evening before the 
robbery. A man resembling Brooks alighted from the truck and 
entered the Vert home, while another individual remained in the 
truck (R. 486-87). This was consistent with Brooks' visit to the 
Verts on the evening before the robbery, ostensibly to view the 
marquise diamond ring, which the Verts had advertised for sale. 
State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d at 819. 
Owing to divorce, Mrs. Langenbacker's last name had changed at 
the time of McGrath's trial (R. 459). 
6 
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 [t]elling me if I don't keep my mouth shut, he would make sure 
it was permanently shut" (R. 470). 
A pawnshop operator testified that one week before the 
Vert robbery, a woman had purchased a Colt semi-automatic pistol 
from him. During this transaction, the woman was "coached" by 
two men, causing the pawnshop operator to believe that the pistol 
was actually purchased for their use (R. 496-98). At McGrath's 
trial, robbery victim Stephanie Vert viewed a picture of the Colt 
pistol, and testified that it looked like the weapon used by 
Brooks during the robbery (R. 436). 
The pistol-purchasing woman was Glenda Steadman. At 
McGrath's trial, Steadman admitted that the men who assisted her 
with the purchase were Brooks and McGrath; McGrath drove the trio 
to the pawnshop, and also provided the money for the weapon. 
However, Steadman claimed that she had purchased the pistol for 
herself--McGrath loaned her the money, she said--and that neither 
Brooks nor McGrath had ever handled the weapon (R. 507-09, 518). 
Steadman then testified that upon taking the pistol home, she 
promptly lost it, and never saw it again (R. 518-19). 
But Steadman's testimony conflicted in part with 
statements she had made during the robbery investigation. One 
officer recalled that Steadman reported purchasing the pistol and 
giving it to McGrath (R. 541-43), Debbie Gale, Steadman's 
roommate at the time of the purchase, also recalled that Steadman 
said that she had given the weapon to McGrath (R. 544, 549). 
Also, police had recorded a telephone call placed to them by 
7 
Steadman in March 1991, during the investigation (R. 582-83) . In 
the taped conversation, edited and replayed at McGrath's trial, 
Steadman indicated that she had given the pistol to McGrath (R. 
567, 584, 183-86). 
Debbie Gale also testified that in February 1991, she 
spoke to McGrath about Brooks' arrest for the Vert robbery. 
According to Gale, McGrath stated that Brooks had "goofed up." 
Gale related that McGrath also described an effort to "melt down" 
the jewelry--an effort associated with the post-robbery visit and 
jewelry display at the Langenbacker home (R. 550-52, 560-61) . 
To counter the foregoing State's evidence, McGrath, 
through counsel, called various witnesses in his defense. Two of 
these witnesses opined that State's witness Debbie Gale was a 
liar (R. 616, 646). Other witnesses gave alibi testimony, 
purporting to place McGrath elsewhere when State's witnesses had 
him participating in the pistol purchase, and around the time of 
the Vert robbery (R. 598-603, 626-41, 647-52, 663-66).3 
In the end, the jury resolved the evidentiary conflicts 
in the State's favor, and found McGrath guilty of theft by 
receiving (R. 233, 727). Facts that are more particular to 
3Dana Barlow was McGrath's girl friend at the time of the Vert 
robbery, and testified that McGrath spent the evenings and nights 
of January 28-29, 1991 with her (R. 599-603). However, the 
prosecutor noted that Barlow's address was within ten blocks of the 
Verts' home (R. 719) . During her testimony Barlow related that she 
began dating McGrath "when he got out of prison this last time" (R. 
599, 604) . This statement, not emphasized by the prosecutor, was 
not objected to at trial, and is not assigned as error on appeal. 
8 
McGrath's arguments on appeal will be set forth under the 
pertinent argument points of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. McGrath's pretrial motion to dismiss, based upon 
his statutory "speedy disposition" argument, was correctly 
denied. When McGrath filed his request for disposition of the 
charges related to the Vert robbery, no charges had been filed. 
Therefore, under Utah precedent and as a matter of sound policy, 
that request did not start the 120-day time period running for 
disposition of charges. 
II. McGrath's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the guilty verdict fails because on appeal, 
he fails to marshal and address the evidence supporting the 
verdict, as required by Utah appellate policy; rather, McGrath 
simply reasserts his unsuccessful trial argument. There was, in 
fact, sufficient evidence to find that the elements of theft by 
receiving had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
III. McGrath's vaguely-formulated, two-part claim of 
"prosecutor misconduct" fails. That claim was not preserved by 
objection at trial, and McGrath has not proven "plain error" in 
the prosecutor's handling of the case. To prove theft by 
receiving, evidence that the jewelry displayed by Brooks and 
McGrath had been stolen was relevant and not unduly inflammatory; 
the "error" element of plain error therefore is unmet for the 
first part of McGrath's claim. Glenda Steadman's statements, 
prior to trial, that she had purchased the apparent robbery 
9 
weapon and given it to McGrath, were also admissible as 
substantive evidence because they conflicted with her account of 
events during McGrath's trial; the error element of plain error 
therefore also fails on this part of McGrath's "prosecutor 
misconduct" claim. 
3CV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying McGrath's mistrial motion, made when it was learned that 
a transcript of Steadman's prior-to-trial inconsistent statements 
had been tciken to the jury room during deliberations. This 
inadvertent act did not constitute reversible error because the 
transcript could have been formally admitted into evidence under 
the rules of evidence. In fact, by giving an "impeachment only" 
instruction to the jury on the transcript's use, the trial court 
gave McGrath an advantage to which he was not entitled. The 
trial court also properly determined that the transcript was not 
"extraneous" evidence forbidden to the jury. 
V. McGrath's argument that trial counsel ineffectively 
represented him must also be rejected. McGrath's affidavit to 
this Court, alleging that counsel improperly barred him from 
testifying in his own defense, cannot be accepted as part of the 
record on appeal, defeating this part of his ineffectiveness 
argument. McGrath's assertion that trial counsel blundered by 
failing to object to certain evidence can be rejected for failure 
to properly brief it on appeal; it also fails because McGrath has 
not demonstrated that counsel transgressed the wide boundaries of 
professionally acceptable representation. 
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VI. The trial court legitimately admitted evidence of 
McGrath's telephoned threat to Mrs. Langenbacker, made after she 
reported McGrath's suspected involvement in the Vert robbery to 
the police. That threat was a relevant "other act," tending to 
prove that McGrath knew that the jewelry displayed by Cory Brooks 
had been stolen. The threat was also far less inflammatory than 
the defendant comments held inadmissible in the Utah case that 
McGrath relies upon in this appeal. 
VII. Finally, McGrath has not proven "plain error" in 
connection with the trial court's remedy, acquiesced in by trial 
counsel, of a jury instruction that erroneously included weapon 
possession as an element of theft by receiving. Ironically, 
McGrath had a higher likelihood of acquittal had the instruction 
not been corrected to delete the weapon possession element; 
therefore, McGrath cannot complain of reversible prejudice 
stemming from the remedy that was provided. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED McGRATH'S 
STATUTORY "SPEEDY DISPOSITION"-BASED MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
In his first point on appeal, McGrath argues that the 
theft by receiving charge should have been dismissed with 
prejudice, because it was not resolved within the 120-day time 
limit of Utah's "speedy disposition" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
77-29-1 (1990) (fully set forth in appendix I of this brief and 
in Br. of Appellant at 13-14). As presented in this case, this 
11 
point involves only statutory construction, decided without 
deference to the trial court. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah 1991). Even so, McGrath's argument fails. 
A. Procedural Background. 
McGrath was arrested for parole violation and for his 
apparent involvement in the Vert robbery on February 21, 1991, 
and returned to prison on the former violation (parole revocation 
documents are also copied in appendix I). As provided in section 
77-29-1, McGrath filed a demand for disposition of charges with 
the prison warden in March 1991. That demand alleged that 
unspecified "[c]harges are now pending against me in the court 
(s) of Salt Lake County West Valley City . . .," and asked that 
it be forwarded "to the appropriate authorities ..." (copied in 
appendix I of this brief and at R. 82). 
However, McGrath was not formally charged with crimes 
related to the Vert robbery until the criminal information was 
filed in August 1991 (R. 8-11). Sometime in December 1991, after 
his preliminary hearing, McGrath was bound over for trial on the 
theft by receiving charge related to the Vert robbery (R. 8-9, 
23-24) . On February 6, 1992, McGrath moved to dismiss the theft 
by receiving charge under section 77-29-1 (R. 80), on the 
strength of his March 1991 disposition demand.4 After a 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 100-02). 
4Through counsel, McGrath expressly disclaimed any 
constitutional "speedy trial" basis for his motion: "We've not 
raised the speedy trial issue at all. The only issue we've raised 
is the limited issue of the statute and it[]s 120 day application. 
That's it" (R. 310). 
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B. Because McGrath's Request for Disposition Was 
Premature, the "Speedy Disposition" Statute Was 
Not Triggered. 
Citing State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991), 
McGrath complains that the nearly fifteen-month period between 
filing his disposition demand and the start of his trial, of 
which the last ten months elapsed after the information was 
filed, was "not supported by good cause" under subsection (4) of 
the speedy disposition statute, and therefore requires dismissal 
of the theft by receiving charge. However, McGrath overlooks the 
earlier subsection (1) of section 77-29-1, not addressed in 
Petersen, which prescribes how the 120-day disposition 
requirement is triggered. 
The trial court did not overlook subsection (1). 
Analyzing that provision, the court discerned three main 
elements, necessary to trigger the 120-day requirement: first, 
the defendant must be serving a term of incarceration; next, an 
"untried indictment or information" must be pending; third, the 
defendant must file a written disposition demand. The "written 
demand" element, in turn, contains three subelements: the demand 
must specify the nature of the pending charge, specify the court 
wherein the charge is pending, and request disposition of the 
charge (R. 318-21) .5 McGrath's dismissal argument founders for 
want of two necessary statutory elements, 
5McGrath's demand (appendix I of this brief) was submitted on 
a preprinted form, evidently prepared by prison officials, that 
does not list the elements of a proper disposition demand under 
section 77-29-1. The trial court and defense counsel alluded to 
this problem (R. 321); however, it is not pursued on appeal. 
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1. No Untried Information. 
The trial court correctly determined that the second 
main element to trigger the 120-day disposition requirement--an 
untried indictment or information--was lacking when McGrath filed 
his disposition demand. Therefore, under State v. Wright, 745 
P.2d 447, 451 (Utah 1987), and State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah 2d 
435, 519 P.2d 244, 246 (1974), both holding that the speedy 
disposition statute does not apply to not-yet-filed criminal 
charges, McGrath's disposition demand was premature, and did not 
trigger the statute's operation.6 
McGrath seems to assume that contemplated charges 
trigger the 120-day disposition statute. Not so. The State was 
not required to immediately file its criminal information, given 
that McGrath was arrested not just in contemplation of formal 
charges connected with the Vert robbery, but also for parole 
violation. Under these circumstances the State was permitted--
indeed, obliged--to not file the criminal information until 
satisfied that it could prove McGrath's guilt beyond a reasonable 
eState v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d 274, 275-76 (1972), 
also supporting this rule, was seemingly overruled in State v. 
Moore, 521 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1974), holding that the time period 
under the former statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 1973), 
commenced upon filing of the information, rather than upon a 
disposition demand made after an information is filed. But Moore, 
a 3-2 opinion that did not mention Farnsworth, involved the State's 
attempt to avoid the speedy disposition requirement by dismissing 
an information as the disposition deadline approached, then 
refiling the same charges anew; this attempt to nullify the 
disposition demand filed upon the original information was properly 
thwarted by the Moore majority. Further, Wright, 745 P.2d at 451, 
approvingly cited Farnsworth, thereby supporting the rule that the 
speedy disposition statute is not triggered until an information is 
filed and a disposition demand is then made. 
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doubt. See State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711, 713 (Utah 1985) (per 
curiam) (decided under constitutional speedy trial principles). 
In line with Smith, Section 77-29-1 should not be construed to 
confer a "speedy charging" requirement. 
In fact, it appears that section 77-29-1 confers no 
more right to speedy filing of charges against McGrath, an 
incarcerated person, than it would to a nonincarcerated person. 
In either situation, the State has a four-year limitations 
period, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (Supp. 1993), to commence a 
felony prosecution by filing an information. Cf. Farnsworth, 519 
P.2d at 246 (predecessor statute did not create "a 90-day statute 
of limitations on any crime, discovered or undiscovered, that [a 
prisoner] may have committed"). In the meantime, the question 
whether McGrath's parole could be formally revoked--in connection 
with the Vert robbery or for other reasons--was, as McGrath 
conceded in the trial court, a matter to be decided by the Board 
of Pardons (R. 309, 314). Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11 (1990). 
2.. Failure to Specify Charges or Court. 
The trial court also noted that McGrath's disposition 
demand did not adequately specify the charges that he alleged 
were pending against him, and the court in which the charges were 
pending. Because the demand thus did not put prosecutors on 
notice of their 120-day disposition obligation, it was 
ineffective (R. 321). This ruling was correct under Wright, 745 
P.2d at 451 (letter from Canadian authorities holding defendant, 
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asking whether Utah authorities wished to prosecute him, did not 
trigger speedy disposition statute). 
It was also correct as a matter of policy. In the 
trial court, the prosecutor explained that upon receipt of 
McGrath's disposition demand, the prosecutor's office would have 
checked for any actually-filed criminal charges against him; 
finding none, no further action would be taken on the demand (R. 
311-13). McGrath argued that the prosecutor's office should have 
entered his disposition demand into its records, so that it would 
come into effect once the information was filed (R. 314, 321). 
However, no unduly onerous burden is created by 
requiring a person in McGrath's position to wait to file a 
disposition demand until a criminal information is actually filed 
and served upon him, or to refile a previous, premature demand at 
that time. It is relatively wasteful of public time and 
resources to record demands for disposition of nonexistent 
charges, against the possibility that charges might later be 
filed. And only upon actual filing of charges can the defendant 
learn their nature and the court in which they are pending, and 
appropriately demand their disposition. 
On balance, it is better to require an incarcerated 
person to file a section 77-29-1 disposition demand when charges 
are actually filed. This policy is in accord with case law 
holding that a premature demand has no effect. For these 
reasons, the trial court correctly rejected McGrath's "speedy 
disposition" argument. 
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POINT TWO 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
GUILTY VERDICT FOR THEFT BY RECEIVING 
In his second point on appeal, McGrath asserts that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. 
His poorly-articulated argument fails. 
A. McGrath Has Not Properly Briefed this Point. 
As a threshold matter, McGrath neither acknowledges nor 
obeys the settled rule that in an appellate challenge to the 
sufficiency of evidence, the appellant must marshal all the 
evidence that supports the verdict, and then demonstrate that, 
even viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, that 
evidence is insufficient. See State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-
39 (Utah App. 1990) (tracing history of evidence-marshaling 
requirement, and holding it applicable in challenges to jury 
verdicts in criminal trials). 
Instead, McGrath repeats his unsuccessful closing trial 
argument, to the effect that he was only an "unknowing spectator" 
to Cory Brooks' commission of the Vert robbery, to Brooks' 
subsequent attempt to dispose of the loot (R. 711). Without 
record citation, McGrath interprets trial testimony in his favor, 
rather than in a verdict-favoring light,7 That does not comply 
with the "marshaling" rule. 
7Without record citation, McGrath asserts that "[t]he 
prosecution, in its opening statement, admitted that it had 
absolutely no evidence linking the defendant, Mr. McGrath, with the 
[Vert] robbery" (Br. of Appellant at 16) . The prosecutor's opening 
statement (R. 420-25) contains no such admission; defense counsel 
made that assertion in his opening argument (R. 426). 
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This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have repeatedly 
refused to consider assignments of error that are not properly 
briefed on appeal. E.g., State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988) (appellate court is "not simply a dumping ground in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research" (quotation and citation omitted))/ State v. Amicone, 
689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to 
support this argument by any legal analysis or authority, we 
decline to rule on it"); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 
App. 1992) ("This court has routinely declined to consider 
arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal"); State v. 
Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992); Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). This Court has also rejected "insufficient evidence" 
arguments for failure to obey the marshaling rule. E.g., State 
v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (UtahApp.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 
943 (Utah 1993). McGrath's "insufficient evidence" argument can 
likewise be rejected, without reaching the merits. 
B. McGrath's Argument Also Fails on its Merits. 
On the merits, the jury was instructed on the elements 
of second degree felony theft by receiving, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-408(1) (Supp. 1993), § 76-6-412 (1990): (1) receiving, 
retaining or disposing of another's property; (2) knowing or 
believing that the property had been stolen; (3) receiving, 
retaining, or disposing of the property with intent to deprive 
the owner of it; and (4) property valued at over one thousand 
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dollars (R. 151) . The jury heard sufficient evidence to find 
that these elements were satisfied. 
As set forth in this brief's fact recitation, McGrath 
purchased a pistol (with Glenda Steadman's help) that looked like 
the weapon used by Cory Brooks in the Vert robbery. After the 
robbery, McGrath drove Brooks to at least two locations during 
efforts to sell jewelry matching that stolen in the robbery. 
After Mrs. Langenbacker reported her suspicions to police, 
McGrath threatened her, tending to confirm his knowing 
involvement in Brooks' criminal activities. Finally, Martha Vert 
testified that the stolen jewelry was valued well above one 
thousand dollars. All this permitted the jury to find that 
second degree felony theft by receiving was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Given the broad deference accorded to jury 
verdicts, e.g., State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987), 
McGrath's appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
therefore fails. 
POINT THREE 
McGRATH HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED "PLAIN ERROR" TO 
SUPPORT HIS APPELLATE ASSERTION OF 
"PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT" 
In his third point on appeal, McGrath asserts that the 
guilty verdict was tainted by "extensive and pervasive 
prosecutorial misconduct." The alleged instances of misconduct, 
however, were not preserved for appeal by objection at trial. 
McGrath acknowledges that "plain error" analysis is therefore 
needed to reach this point (Br. of Appellant at 22-23) . 
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"Plain error" consists of three elements: First, there 
must be error. Second, the error "should have been obvious" to 
the trial court when it occurred; that is, it must be "palpable." 
Third, the error must have been prejudicial to the defense; that 
is, there must exist "a reasonable likelihood that absent the 
error, the outcome below would have been more favorable." It is 
McGrath's burden to show that all three elements are satisfied. 
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
McGrath has not carried his burden. His broadly-cast 
argument cites case law and rules about prosecutors' ethical 
responsibilities. He then alleges, without citation to the 
record, that the prosecutor in this case performed unethically 
(Br. of Appellant at 17-25) .8 He makes no real effort to show 
that the alleged prosecutor missteps were obvious or "palpable." 
Like his "insufficient evidence" argument, addressed in Point Two 
of this brief, this Court can reject McGrath's "prosecutor 
misconduct" argument for lack of proper appellate analysis. 
8Regarding three claimed prosecutorial missteps in McGrath's 
Brief of Appellant at 23, the prosecutor admitted that McGrath was 
not on triail for robbery, but that the stolen goods that he was 
charged with receiving had been stolen in the Vert robbery (R. 
711); this was in rebuttal to defense counsel's "unknowing 
spectator" argument. The prosecutor did state that Brooks had been 
convicted of the Vert robbery (R. 693); Brooks' Brief of Appellant 
to this Court, No. 920853-CA, at 3, confirms that Brooks was found 
guilty in March 1992, before the June 1992 closing argument in this 
case--making the prosecutor's statement true. The State cannot 
locate an Instance wherein the prosecutor "stated . . . that Ms. 
Steadman's testimony could be considered by the jury as substantive 
evidence." 
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A. The Prosecutor Advanced No Obviously Improper 
"Aiding and Abetting" Case. 
Without conceding that it is obliged to do so, the 
State will attempt to clarify and respond to the merits of 
McGrath's "prosecutor misconduct" argument. McGrath asserts that 
the prosecutor improperly tried him for "aiding and abetting" the 
Vert robbery. He broadly laments that the prosecutor "delved 
constantly into irrelevant facts," and "paraded" Cory Brooks' 
"egregious activities, and even his gun" before the jury "for the 
deliberate purpose of alarming them and tainting [the] 
prosecution" (Br. of Appellant at 9, 16, 21). 
In essence, McGrath's argument really is that the 
prosecutor used inadmissible evidence to convict him. However, 
he does not prove plain error in the admission of the now 
complained-of evidence. McGrath does not demonstrate how this 
evidence was irrelevant to the elements of theft by receiving, or 
if relevant, that its probative value was "substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" under Rules 4 01, 
4 02, 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.9 
To prove theft by receiving, it was necessary for the 
State to prove that McGrath had reason to believe that the 
jewelry displayed by Brooks, in McGrath's company, was stolen. 
9McGrath sprinkles his "prosecutor misconduct" argument with 
terminology such as "due process," the right to an impartial jury, 
and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, plus citation to 
American Bar Association standards and attorney ethical standards. 
Believing the evidentiary issues identified in the main text to 
more accurately characterize the nub of McGrath's argument, the 
State does not further respond his other, undeveloped assertions. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (Supp. 1993). Therefore, there was 
no error in permitting Stephanie Vert to describe the Vert 
robbery and the events surrounding it (R. 434-37): that 
description was relevant to an element of the crime charged 
against McGrath. Evidence that McGrath, accompanied by Brooks, 
helped to purchase the weapon evidently used in the robbery also 
helped tie him to the robbery and to the subsequent attempts to 
dispose of the stolen goods. 
Further, the foregoing evidence was not unfairly 
prejudicial to McGrath: Stephanie Vert's description was 
unembellished, simply stating that Brooks "held me at gunpoint" 
and left her "[h]andcuffed to the bathroom pipes . . . " (R. 436, 
437) . She did not describe how Brooks ordered her to crawl into 
the bathroom, how he had her repeat the process of cuffing 
herself to the plumbing, and how he threatened "[you better not 
remember what I look like," recounted in this Court's review of 
Brooks' conviction. State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah 
App. 1993).. Thus redacted of unneeded detail, the robbery 
description was not likely to rouse McGrath's trial jury to 
"overmastering hostility" against him. Cf. State v. Shickles, 
760 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1988). Similarly, the evidence that 
McGrath helped to purchase the apparent robbery weapon was not 
inflammatory; it described only factual observations. 
Nor does McGrath satisfy the "obviousness" element of 
plain error. The above-cited rules of evidence, dealing with 
relevance and the balance between relevance and unfair prejudice, 
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vest substantial discretion in the trial courts. Bambrough v. 
Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976) (Utah R. Evid. 402); 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (Utah R. 
Evid. 403). McGrath conceivably could argue that another trial 
judge might more strictly limit the description of the Vert 
robbery and the gun purchase under these rules. That, however, 
falls short of proving "obvious" error. 
There is merit to McGrath's contention that the now-
challenged evidence harmed his defense. This was a rather close 
case; the jury required eight hours to reach its verdict (R. 
236). Without the now-challenged evidence, the State might not 
have prevailed at trial. But no known principle denies the State 
an opportunity to prevail in close cases. And because McGrath 
has not proven that the now-challenged evidence was inadmissible, 
much less obviously inadmissible, the question whether that 
evidence harmed him is of no concern: this Court can conclude 
that any harm, like that caused by any properly admitted 
evidence, was legitimately visited upon McGrath. 
B. The Prosecutor Made No Obviously Improper Use of 
Impeachment Evidence. 
McGrath's argument that the prosecutor improperly used 
"impeachment testimony as substantive evidence" appears to 
complain about the edited tape of Glenda Steadman's March 1991 
phone conversation with police, played to the jury at McGrath's 
1992 trial. At trial, Steadman denied purchasing the suspected 
robbery weapon for McGrath; in the March 1991 conversation, 
however, Steadman had admitted that she had done so, even stating 
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that McGrath had helped to select the weapon (R. 185-88, copied 
in appendix II of this brief).10 The trial court ruled that the 
tape could be used only to impeach Steadman's trial testimony, 
and not as substantive evidence (R. 566-67). 
Even if the Steadman tape had been admitted as 
substantive evidence, this would not satisfy the "error" element 
of plain error. The tape revealed a prior inconsistent statement 
that Steadman was allowed to explain or deny at McGrath's trial, 
and about which McGrath, through counsel, was able to question 
Steadman (R. 516-26, also copied in appendix II). Under Rule 
613(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, the conversation was therefore 
admissible, with no "impeachment only" limitation. 
The Steadman tape also fell outside the definition of 
hearsay, under Rule 801(d)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence; under this 
rule, too, the taped conversation was admissible as substantive 
evidence. State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 483-84 (Utah 1989) . In 
short, by limiting the use of the Steadman tape for impeachment 
only the trial court erred--but to McGrath's advantage. McGrath 
has no cause to complain of such error. 
Because the Steadman tape was admissible for its 
substance, it necessarily follows that "obviousness" element of 
plain error is also unmet on this appellate evidentiary challenge 
by McGrath. Nor can the "prejudice" element of plain error be 
satisfied with respect to the Steadman tape. McGrath exaggerates 
10The tape also recounts a post-robbery attempt by Brooks to 
dispose of the pistol; at trial, Steadman denied any recollection 
of describing such an attempt (R. 183, 518). 
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if he asserts that the prosecutor overused the tape in his 
closing argument; he mentioned it only briefly, in rebuttal, and 
in connection with the independent evidence that Steadman had 
bought the suspected robbery weapon for McGrath (R. 715-16).n 
Thus McGrath has proven no "plain error" ground for appellate 
relief on this evidentiary question. 
Perhaps McGrath means to argue that the Steadman tape 
was not adequately edited of inadmissible content (Br. of 
Appellant at 22) . However, the record reveals that the trial 
court and counsel for both parties were quite diligent in editing 
the tape (R. 567-78); the version played to the jury (transcribed 
at R. 183-88, appendix II of this brief) recounts portions of the 
conversation to the effect that the pistol was purchased for 
McGrath, without being so gutted by the editing of less relevant 
material as to be rendered meaningless. 
In fact, when it came time to play the edited tape to 
the jury, defense counsel expressly acquiesced (R. 584). Given 
this, along with the trial court's discretion in questions of 
relevance and prejudice, it cannot be said (if McGrath means to 
argue) that plain error was committed in the editing and playback 
of the taped conversation. 
nNo matter how the jury utilized the taped conversation, the 
net effect would be to reject Steadman's testimony that she did not 
purchase the pistol for McGrath, and to conclude that she had done 
so. As Judge Hand put it, "If, from all that the jury see of the 
witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but 
what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they 
see and hear of that person and in court." Di Carlo v. United 
States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2nd Cir. 1925). 
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POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED McGRATH'S 
MISTRIAL MOTION, AGAINST HIS CONTENTION THAT 
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE WAS REVIEWED DURING 
-JURY DELIBERATIONS. 
McGrath next contends that a mistrial should have been 
granted when the trial court learned that the edited transcript 
of Glenda Steadman's taped conversation with police, described in 
Point Three of this brief (and copied in appendix II), had been 
taken into the jury room during deliberations. The trial court, 
however, did not abuse its discretion, State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 
186, 190 (Utah 1988), in denying the mistrial motion.12 
A. Procedural Background. 
McGrath accurately recounts that the transcript, issued 
to help the. jurors listen to the Steadman tape (R. 584) but not 
admitted into evidence, was inadvertently allowed into the jury 
room. This was discovered when the jurors sent out a note, 
asking the trial court about how to use the material for 
impeachment purposes (the note was penned on the transcript, R. 
183, copied in appendix II). The trial court retrieved the 
transcript, consulted with counsel, and responded that the 
contents of the taped conversation were to be used only for 
impeachment--not as substantive evidence (R. 189, 732-35). 
12Each juror evidently received a copy of the transcript; it 
is referred to in the singular only for purposes of clarity in the 
main text of this brief. Because McGrath's trial counsel did move 
for a mistrial on this point (R. 731), thereby preserving it for 
appellate review, there is no need for "plain error" analysis, as 
suggested by McGrath (Br. of Appellant at 3, 26) . 
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B. The Mistrial Motion Was Properly Denied. 
For three reasons, the trial court properly denied 
McGrath's mistrial motion. First, as explained in Point Three of 
this brief, the trial court erroneously ruled that the taped 
conversation was inadmissible as substantive evidence: under the 
pertinent evidentiary rules, it was admissible to prove the facts 
asserted therein. Utah R. Evid. 613(b), 801(d)(1). The 
transcript, accurately setting forth the edited tape's content, 
was admissible extrinsic evidence of Steadman's prior 
inconsistent statement. Utah R. Evid. 613(b).13 Therefore, it 
does not matter if the transcript was inadvertently admitted into 
evidence: it could have been formally admitted. 
Second, the trial court remedied the perceived problem, 
by retrieving the transcript, and re-instructing the jury that 
its contents were to be used for impeachment only. Once more, 
because that limitation on the use of the Steadman tape was not 
legally required, McGrath was probably not entitled to that 
remedy. He ought not complain, on appeal, of receiving such 
unduly favorable treatment. 
Third, even assuming that the transcript should not 
have gone to the jury, the trial court concluded that the 
transcript was dissimilar from the kinds of "extraneous" 
"Adequate foundation was laid for admission of the taped 
conversation and the transcript. The officer who recorded the 
conversation authenticated the tape (R. 582-83). In editing the 
tape and transcript for their presentation to the jury, the trial 
court and counsel appear to have been satisfied that the transcript 
accurately reflected the tape (R. 567-78, 732). 
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materials or "outside influence," Utah R. Evid. 606(b), normally 
considered impermissible for jury deliberations: 
[T]here is a distinction in the court's mind 
between this and the kind of other extraneous 
materials that you refer to, Mr. Athay, such as a 
dictionary. A dictionary is filled with all kinds 
of information that juries [] can read and apply or 
misapply. 
This transcript of the telephonic 
conversation was edited prior to the time that the 
tape was played to the jury. It contains only 
what the jury heard anyway; and the question in 
the court's mind clearly indicates that the jury 
knew that this was being used to impeach the 
testimony of the witness. 
(R. 732). On appeal, McGrath does not attack this reasoning, 
which permits this Court to affirm the denial of McGrath's 
mistrial motion. 
POINT FIVE 
McGRATH HAS NOT PROVEN THAT HE WAS 
INEFFECTIVELY ASSISTED BY TRIAL COUNSEL 
McGrath next argues that he was ineffectively assisted 
by trial counsel. This Sixth Amendment-based claim is governed 
by a familiar, two-element standard. The complaining defendant 
must prove, first, that counsel's performance was objectively 
deficient. Second, the defendant must prove that prejudice 
resulted from counsel's deficiency; i.e., that but for the 
alleged counsel blunder(s), there is a reasonable probability 
that the trial outcome would have been different. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 696 (1984); State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 118-19 SL n.2 (Utah 1989). The defendant has a heavy 
burden of persuasion on both elements. Parsons v. Barnes, 23 0 
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Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5-6 (Utah 1994). In this case, McGrath has not 
carried his burden. 
A. McGrath's Allegation that Counsel Improperly 
Prevented Him from Testifying in His Own Defense 
is Unsupported bv Record Evidence. 
McGrath's primary counsel ineffectiveness argument 
rests upon his allegation that during trial, counsel refused to 
let McGrath testify in his own defense (Br. of Appellant at 8-9, 
27-33). As a factual matter, that allegation is unsupported by 
the trial court record. Instead, McGrath raises it in an ex 
parte affidavit, copied in an addendum to his brief on appeal. 
McGrath's affidavit cannot stand as proof of any 
factual matter pertinent to his counsel ineffectiveness argument. 
Its credibility is untested, and trial counsel has been afforded 
no opportunity to respond to it. The affidavit is, in short, "a 
unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to 
determine." State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 
1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). Accord State v. Cook, 
714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 
(Utah 1984) ("This Court cannot rule on matters outside the trial 
court record"). Accordingly, this Court should strike McGrath's 
affidavit, and summarily reject all aspects of his counsel 
ineffectiveness argument that depend upon it.14 
"McGrath has filed no motion for an evidentiary hearing under 
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to find whether trial 
counsel in fact barred him from testifying. Because the rule 
specifies that such a motion must "be filed prior to the filing of 
the appellant's brief," McGrath has waived the right to do so. 
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Consistent with such disposition, the State does not 
address any possible merit to this aspect of McGrath's counsel 
ineffectiveness claim under Strickland. McGrath's argument is 
essentially based upon hypothetical facts; as such, the State 
perceives no worthwhile purpose in addressing it. 
B. McGrath's Argument that Trial Counsel Improperly 
Failed to Object to Certain Evidence is Not 
Properly Briefed on Appeal. 
McGrath also asserts that trial counsel blundered by 
not objecting to evidence about Cory Brooks' commission of the 
Vert robbery. This assertion, however, is formulated in 
conclusory terms, without articulate analysis. E.g., Br. of 
Appellant at 10 (fact recitation alleging that "totally 
irrelevant" and "highly prejudicial" evidence was received); id. 
at 33-34 (argument that counsel should have objected to evidence 
on grounds of irrelevance and undue prejudice). Like his 
"insufficient evidence" and "prosecutor misconduct" assertions, 
described in Points Two and Three of this brief, this aspect of 
McGrath's counsel ineffectiveness claim can be rejected for 
failure to properly analyze it on appeal. 
On the merits, trial counsel performed competently in 
dealing with the State's evidence. As set forth in Point Three 
of this brief, responding to McGrath's "prosecutor misconduct" 
argument, evidence of Brooks' commission of the Vert robbery was 
relevant to prove theft by receiving, and as presented in this 
case, not unduly prejudicial to McGrath. Trial counsel, 
exercising his professional judgment, was clearly permitted to 
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recognize this, and to limit his evidentiary objections 
accordingly. And given the defense theory that McGrath was 
merely an "unknowing spectator" to Brooks' criminal acts (R. 
711), such objections would seldom be necessary. 
Further, as McGrath admits, evidentiary objections can 
themselves prejudice the defense (Br. of Appellant at 25); he 
therefore cannot assail trial counsel for failing to raise every 
conceivable objection. McGrath has not proven that trial 
counsel's approach to evidence of Brooks' crimes was outside "the 
wide range of professionally reasonable assistance," Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689. Therefore, McGrath has not proven that counsel 
performed deficiently in this regard. 
McGrath concedes away the "resulting prejudice" element 
of counsel ineffectiveness. He simply alleges that had trial 
counsel approached the evidentiary questions differently, "the 
outcome at trial may well have been a verdict of not guilty" (Br. 
of Appellant at 34-35). That is only an assertion that counsel's 
alleged miscues "had some conceivable effect on the outcome of 
the proceeding," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; it falls short of 
the required "reasonable probability" of a more favorable result, 
id. at 694. All in all, McGrath's counsel ineffectiveness 
argument does not warrant appellate relief. 
POINT SIX 
EVIDENCE OF McGRATH'S THREAT AGAINST A 
STATE'S WITNESS WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
In his sixth, rather cursory point on appeal, McGrath 
argues that evidence of his threat against Mrs. Langenbacker was 
31 
inadmissible. Mrs. Langenbacker testified that a couple of days 
after she called police to report her suspicion of McGrath's and 
Brooks' involvement in the Vert robbery, McGrath telephoned her, 
telling Mrs. Langenbacker to keep her mouth shut, or else "he 
would make sure it was permanently shut." (R. 470) .15 Under the 
substantial discretion vested in trial courts to determine the 
relevance and the prejudicial risks of evidence, e.g., Bambrough 
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976) (Utah R. Evid. 402), 
and State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (Utah R. 
Evid. 403), McGrath's threat was legitimately admitted. 
To prove theft by receiving, the State had to prove 
that McGrath knowingly participated, with Brooks, in possessing 
or disposing of the jewelry stolen in the Vert robbery. McGrath 
mounted an "unknowing spectator" defense, denying the essential 
"knowing" mens rea element of the offense. By threatening Mrs. 
Langenbacker, McGrath demonstrated awareness that the jewelry was 
stolen; therefore, the threat was relevant to a disputed element 
of the crime, and admissible under Rules 401 and 402 Utah Rules 
of Evidence. And as an "other act" tending to show "absence of 
mistake or accident" in McGrath's association with Brooks' 
activities, the threat was also admissible under Rule 404(b), 
Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 698 & 
n.4 (Utah App.) (defendant asserted that he was an innocent 
15The trial court sustained a hearsay-based objection to Curtis 
Langenbacker's attempt to testify that after he took the marquise 
diamond ring, Brooks threatened that he and McGrath would hurt 
Curtis if he tried to "rip him off" (R. 474). 
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bystander to his wife's drug dealing; his effort to collect debts 
from her sale of drugs on credit was supported by Rule 4 04 case 
law), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 586 (Utah 1993). 
Nor was the threat so inflammatory in its content as to 
render it unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. In this regard, State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 
1989), relied upon by McGrath, is readily distinguishable. In 
Maurer, a letter written by the murder defendant to the victim's 
father was deemed inadmissible under Rule 403, because even 
though it admitted the defendant's guilt, it also contained 
language that was highly likely to inflame the jury. 770 P.2d at 
982 (calling victim "a fucking whore," "a stupid bitch," and 
saying that it "was a great feeling to watch her die"). The one-
sentence threat by McGrath in this case pales in comparison to 
the disapproved evidence in Maurer. Therefore, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in permitting that threat to be 
revealed at McGrath's trial. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY DEFINING 
THEFT BY RECEIVING 
As his final point on appeal, McGrath argues that the 
trial court committed "plain error" by instructing the jury, in 
instruction number one, that possession of a dangerous weapon was 
an element of the charged crime, theft by receiving. During its 
deliberations, the jury asked the trial court about the variance 
between that instruction and instruction thirteen, which 
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accurately--that is, without mention of a weapon--set forth the 
elements of theft by receiving. Responding, the court informed 
the jury that the "dangerous weapon" language in instruction one 
was to be disregarded, and that it was to reach its verdict on 
instruction- thirteen only (R. 182, copied, with instructions one 
and thirteen, in appendix III of this brief). 
That response properly remedied the instructional 
error. And because that remedy was provided upon consultation 
with counsel (R. 182, 735), who did not thereafter object, 
McGrath's assertion of "obvious error" fails: the involved 
parties expressly agreed that the trial court's remedy--which 
corrected an erroneous statement of the law--was proper. 
Nor is the "prejudice" element of plain error 
satisfied. Ironically, the corrected error was of a type that, 
if uncorrected, could have actually aided McGrath: unable to 
find that McGrath was armed at any time relevant to the 
commission of theft by receiving, the jury would have acquitted 
him, had it believed that possession of a weapon was an element 
of that offense. Therefore, McGrath cannot claim reversible 
error in this point on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
McGrath was fairly tried and justly found guilty of 
theft by receiving stolen property. Accordingly, his conviction 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \\Q day of June, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. ¥KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX I 
"Speedy Disposition" Statute 
March 1991 Disposition Demand 
Parole Revocation Documents 
77-28a-5 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-28a-5. Governor — Power to enter into contracts. 
The governor is empowered to enter into such contracts on behalf of this 
state as may be appropriate to implement its participation in the Interstate 
Corrections Compact pursuant to Article m thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28*5, enacted by L. 
1982, ch. 38, § 1; 1983, ch. 320, § 92. 
CHAPTER 29 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST 
PRISONERS 
Section 
77-29-1. 
77-29-2. 
77-29-3. 
77-29-4 
77-29-5 
Prisoner's demand for disposition 
of pending charge — Duties of 
custodial officer — Continuance 
may be granted — Dismissal of 
charge for failure to bring to 
trial 
Duty of custodial officer to inform 
prisoner of untried indictments 
or informations. 
Chapter inapplicable to incompe-
tent persons 
Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
Interstate agreement on detainers 
— Enactment into law — Text 
of agreement. 
Section 
77-29-6. 
77-29-7. 
77-29-8. 
77-29-9. 
77-29-10. 
77-29-11. 
Interstate agreement — "Appro-
priate court" defined. 
Interstate agreement — Duty of 
state agencies and political sub-
divisions to co-operate. 
Interstate agreement — Applica-
tion of habitual criminal law 
Interstate agreement — Escape of 
prisoner while in temporary 
custody. 
Interstate agreement — Duty of 
warden. 
Interstate agreement — Attorney 
general as administrator and 
information agent. 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Contin-
uance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be for-
warded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the 
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or cus-
todial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, pro-
vide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment 
of the demanding* prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
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open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds 
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within 
the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion 
for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed 
with prejudice. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 16, t 2. 
ANALYSIS 
Commencement of period. 
Delay caused by codefendant's action. 
Delay caused by prisoner. 
Forfeiture. 
Good cause for continuance. 
Good cause for failure. 
Premature request. 
Prosecutor's delay. 
Warden's delay. 
Written demand. 
Commencement of period. 
Ninety-day period for prosecution under for-
mer f 77-65-1 commenced on the day defen-
dant notified county attorney of his request for 
final disposition of case or cases pending 
against him; and the filing of a complaint, in-
formation or indictment did not affect the com-
mencement of the period. State v. Moore, 521 
P.2d 556 (Utah 1974). 
Motion to dismiss charges against defendant 
who was brought to trial 92 days after warden 
received notice of his request for final disposi-
tion of pending charges was properly denied 
since computation of then 90-day time period 
commenced from date that notice was deliv-
ered to county attorney and appropriate court. 
State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975). 
Delay caused by codefendant's action. 
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of 
the charges where the trial was delayed be-
yond the 120-day time period, and the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
that there was good cause for the delay, where 
the delay was reasonable and not the result of 
the prosecution's actions or inactions, but was 
due to a codefendant, who was to be jointly 
tried with defendant and who was expected to 
plead guilty at trial as the result of plea negoti-
ations, changing his plea to not guilty on the 
scheduled trial date. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 
403 (Utah 1982). 
Cross-References. — Right to speedy trial, 
Utah Const., Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6. 
Delay ceased by prisoner. 
Where statute provided that prisoner be 
brought to trial within ninety days of his re-
quest for disposition of pending charges, the 
ninety-day disposition period was to be ex-
tended by the amount of time during which 
defendant himself created delay. State v. 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982). 
Forefeiture. 
Defendant did not forfeit his right to have 
charges against him dismissed by remaining 
silent and failing to request an earlier setting 
when trial court set date for trial beyond 
ninety-day period required under former 
§ 77-65-1; burden of complying with statute 
rested on prosecutor. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 
2d 361, 453 P.2d 158 (1969). 
Good cause for continuance. 
Where defendant's trial date was originally 
set for time within ninety-day period provided 
for under former § 77-65-1 but, to accommo-
date defendant's counsel, was postponed until 
five days beyond the statutory period, the order 
fixing the trial date was within the authority 
of the court since good cause for a continuance 
had been shown. State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 
117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970). 
Trial court was within its discretion in 
granting continuance for trial on date 91 days 
after defendant had submitted written request 
for disposition of pending criminal case where 
subpoenas had not been issued soon enough to 
proceed with trial on original date, despite de-
fendant's counsel suggesting trial date within 
ninety-day period. Danks v. Turner, 28 Utah 
2d 277, 501 P.2d 631 (1972). 
Good cause for failure. 
Defendant, who was charged at a time he 
had other cases pending against him and in 
one of those cases requested and received psy-
chiatric examination and who was appointed 
various counsel because of necessity and at his 
own request, was not denied right to speedy 
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NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF 
PENDING CHARGE (S). 
TO: GERALD L- COOK, DIRECTOR, UTAH STATE PRISON. 
Notice is hereby given that I, /7?/4r£ FJuUfiCcX M^B&n 
do hereby request final disposition of any charge (s) now pending 
against me in any court in the State of Utah. Charges are now 
pending against me in the court (s) of 
County and request is hereby made that you forward this notice 
to the appropriate authorities in that county (s), together with 
such other information as required by law. 
Pending Charge Theft in West Valley City 
Dated this <2% day of jfj&&tAf*y 
~KJ*J. . vef'J* 
V- , 1 9 9 / . 
'W f^c USP # /T/oC 
I hereby certify thiat I received a copu of the foregoing Notice 
this </**- day of ^-T^ia-ocJi^ , 199 / 
Agent Authorized 
Utah State Prison 
Draper, Utah 84020 
EXHIBIT 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
BOX 250 DRAPER, UTAH 
04020 
CIRTIFICATE FOR DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS 
TO: salt Lake County Attorney R E : Mark McGrath 
231 East 400 South USP #18106 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TERM. OF COMMITMENT 0-5. 1-15 CC 0-5 CS 
TIME SERVED 4 Yrs 11 j Months 
TIME REMAINING 16 Yrs. 
PAROLE ELIGIBIILTY Returned 2/25/91 on ParnlP v ^ ^ M n n , »*c 
Not been before Board of Pardons yet. 
BOARD OF PARDONS DECISION 
GERALD L COOK, DIRECTOR 
JUNE HINDKLEY / 
RECORDS & ID OFFICER 
cc: County Clerk 
File 
[n I h e M d t l e i i I I i PKIRtVOC A l l »N HI M 1 N 
^REREVOCATIPN HFAMNl I INFORM/UK N 
4CGRA71I MAI h I HW RD USF # 1 8 1 0 6 O B S C l b . # 9 9 ^ t 4 8 z j 
The S t a t e of Ut a) A d u l t P i b a t i o n a n d P a l J< I M i i i e MAKF H i U ' M V/U 
Df V i o l a t l l II »f I | d l < 1( I l l l f I I I U l l i q f 1 1 t 1 Oil 1 '^1 "r" \t V-i 
H I n v m q f a i l e d t o s u b m i t t o i n i n a l y s i s , i n 
i d ut rpl - M M ry 1(^ 1991 i n v i o l a t i o n of 
S p e c i a l C o n d i t i o n N n i i t t I I r P a r o l e 
A g r e e m e n t 
? By h a v i n g u m r u t t e d t l u o f f e n s e of I h e t t by 
R e c e i v i n g , on or a b o u t J a n u a r y ?9 1 9 9 1 , i n 
S a l t L a k e C o u n t y , S t a t e of U t a h in v i o l a t i o n 
of ( u r i d i l i n Numb* i ' »f t h e f n o l e A g i e e m e n t . 
J . ft) h a v i n g 11 mnu t t ed 1 lit o f f e n s e of P o s s e s s i o n 
of a D e a d l y Weapon, on o r abou t F e b r u a r y 19 , 
1 9 9 1 , i n Summit C o u n t > , S t a t e of U t a h i n 
v i o l a t i o n of C o n d i t i o n Number 3 of t h e P a i o l e 
A q i e e m e n f 
and hdr • t h a t 1 hi same MARK EDWARD MfGRAFB w=o p a r o l e d f rom t h e U t a h 
S t a t e Pi I ^  r on MH Ht h d i i I J inu u y 1 u u I HI 1 t Ix ah \ p e n n d u e I i c in 
v] o 1 a! tc r f h i s \ a r t l e M l ac c u s e d pa i c 1 e v i c 1 a! oi I M U » t h r i |l I I 
r e s p o n d f( t h e a l l e g a t i o n made a g a i n s t Hieiit, t o h a v e v n l u n t a i n r u i f r i e s s e s 
a p p e a r i I hf i i IK f u l l , p i e s e n t r e l e v a n t e v i d e n r e by a l t i d a v i t " r I M 
means ^) I t tie r i qht t f que * t i n per c n c h i if i i f M M ! " i o n i I i I hi 
a l l e g e d p a i o l e v i o l a t i o n s i r e b a s e d 
H o w e v e r , f M H H e a r i n g O f f i i e i d e t e i n n i i e 1 I I M I I lit N i nt i u in I •* 
s u b j e c t l o T I sk i hni m i f h i r hf i i d e n t i t y w( if1 r l i s i l o s e r i h< nf e I t 
s u b j e c t e d t o c o n l i ou t a t i o n a r d o i o c s e x i n n n a ! 
D a t e d t h i s ZQth da» o£ F t b i u a i ^ l f U l , 
? ^ c n M Mr? crua ? / f E t E R M. NELSON, S1IPFFV T SOP 
* R e g i o n TIT P a r o l e 
3 3 4 7 n / b v 
UKI'ORR THE 
1-H M A T ' I - K r 
USP # 1 8 1 0 6 
U
'*RRAN1 
I III HI"1 Mi!'!)1" )] I1 „ IM M >NS «" >!• T F IT"" SI VIP O r i T M l 
in ,m\ I'l'iKV OIIK IM \ti\te ol li Lili (in eimj's 
l?\ n rrlil'inl W.ni.mi Rc«n*^si haunp hru ,iadc K l o k the Board hv J a m e s T u r n e r 
a n d mi nfifii .1 ' li I  ill A ' l i i i i i n i II'1" I 'I in I I i ,1 I A I I'n l.i ^ ml t l l ' f d w i i h I h c W a r r a n t R e q u e s t t h a t t h c i c i s 
f - i h i - f i i i *; t M )i i  *\ fifiw \'V 11 i (11 \\ it ( i « n i l i "i 11 i I ( u 11 I I ii i i n l 
I ') f o s s e s s i c n o f D e a H v W e a p c i1 ,  V ) '"r h e f t: b y R e c e i v I n g ; 3 ) T a 11 u r e 
t o ifubmi t U > \<a11,1<*111 111• i, i"ia 1 y s i s 
li i1,/111,11^  (wen enmimiied and dial ilir peison named ahuve has commill( ;id it/them; ant i 
conditio' - i i by Ihc Board ol -JIV 
hKKFOKK COMMANDED ^ vc-named parolee an 
n» **• detained »^*» pending a determination whether 
* < ^ i«ed the conditions of his oi her pai o!e. 
F e b r u a r y jy 91 
BEFORE THE BOARD 0* PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UT/U STATE OBSCIS :TO. 99994323 
Consideration of the Statt )* of MCCRATH, MARK 'EDWARD PR ISON NO. 18106 
Tiie above-entitled aattei: c a ^ before the Utah State bo.- -r. a " 
Parole Revocation Hearing on 15th day of May, 1991. 
Tae parolee entered the follow!.:- pleas to the allei^atl ^ n< contain*--. - the 
Information of Parole Violation: 
it Allegation 
"SP^S ""ijalTAi^srsriT 27WIT91 
VA-3A 2 COMMITTED: THEFT (RECEIVING) 
FA-3A 3 COMIITTF.i): 7:<A?0>«T3 VICl,vrr 'H 
A.;end G u i l t y N o t G u i l t y D i smis s NC 
A l t e r e n t r y of t ^ a b o v e - p l e / f r ^ the r . s t a t e m e n t s o f MCGkATH, J1AR:< EDWARD, 
j a r^ iee , 
t M above>] 
23£kL<L<L ^ i i ^ V T ^ > a t t ^ r n e v i or tr:e p a r o l e e , li ie iioard made a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e p a r o l e e h . u no t compi l ed w i t h the. c o n d i t i o n s 
o r d e r s : 
v / RevoKc- \ \ ' I 
Paro j _ -:u o e : ^ect.iv -
p a r o l e o.cice.j 
t h : ol i.:^**^- s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s : 
^e-'i^-ri.'Vj. ;ov 
" .ocu ' ie -if * < c t i v e 
E c . r / . ; c 
^ ^ E J L i i 
ervtence ef f e o . t i w _ _ _ _ ! , _ < A 
i a u . i 
?/ OXSXte 
" 1 BURGLARY ~"~ " 
2 BURGLARY 
Z DESTRUCTION Or PROPERTY. 
4 COMMUNICATION FRAJ II ) 
^.. 
•r-v«':r 
^ M - H ; 
15 9e. 
- o 
v^ j -3 57: 
RUSSO:J 
RU:iS0:: 
FREDERICK 
" x P I R A T I O ^ 
"^^171^91 
0 3 / 0 1 / 2 0 ^ 2 
J 2 / 0 1 / 1 9 9 2 
0 2 / 2 S / 2 0 0 7 
i l l ; ? V L 1 O ' I oy t : i e Soar..! of P a r d o n s at 
a n y t i m e • *" \ll a.ut• J'-. 1 r e l e a s e * r >;, c . iL ;LO'.y 
b;;r o r d e r of t h e B j . j r f f V i r i o n - of i . _ - t ' L 
15 th day of Hay, 1"?J , a f f i x e d ~,? c i ^ n a t i . : * <^ C -a* 
o n b e: i a 1 • " f f V r ^ * TT t ~ l < i . ' -". - . 
^r, 
: -I. I •. H A UN, C n a i i^nia n f ) 
COURT CASE # 
5 c"R 85-1371 
5 CXS6 1579 
15 931 
r; 9P.7 
JUDGE 
ROTIUfl 
FRi-;OE-llCK 
RUSSON 
RUfiSOJJ 
EXPIRATION 
1 2 / o i / i y y r 
11/30/1996 
11/29/2.011 
11/29/7.001 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
T;K: scaius of MCCAA^H, v^RK EJ^VID , JSP \7o. ISIQQ , CB3CIS Wo. 99994323 
came before the Utah State Board of Pardons for a Parole Revocation Hearing on 
tie 14th day of August, 1931. 
CRIME OF COMMITMENT 
1 BURGLARY 
2 CO:flUNICVTiO:-J FRAUD 
3 BURGLARY 
4 TJErl (RECElvi:^) 
The parolee entered rhe following pleas to the allegation? contained in the 
Parole Violation Information: 
Ji
 A l l ega t ion ^ ' i ^ i i ^ a i - t y "o tGui l ty THs-aiss 
ivp'-T"~~T ^\lA-^UilU: 02TlTTi7'~ '_ _ J_ "' 
PA-3A /. COMMUTED: THEFT (RECEIVIN-J) __ " \ 
- l i ter receivi: ; ; ; t:,c- above p l e a s , and wearing s ta tements <_ 1*0:2 the pa ro l ee , 
ii:/>/"•• •:..•* •ittor4i.:-:y, an : ^ ^e^rcyent-atiY'.: f:,vr.: \rhjit i ' f j ^ i ' . o ^ and Paro le , thf: 
fjosrd nade a .finding tha t the paro lee has noi complied w:!.th the cond i t ions -
]i-"iueic -in-: cc:icl::d.i-i taat t h i s pa ro l e s 1? ir, violafior: or hi :- /ner p a r o l e . 
Rojvok'5 paro le l a t e . 
Restart p?rolc on _ _ wit;* fcllowiu;/ special conditio::.?: 
1 . -';•. 
2. 
Terminate sentence (including parole r.opervision on) _ 
j.:cpiration of senj^nce to I- <*ffert* v,:% 
Schedule rehearing for _ 
Otuer: fflnJUll/f pertfJj/Jti MlUrJifQ ^4X1 iff 
.aa&u}^^ 1 _ 
Ttv reasons for t:i..s decision are -Hent iMsd or., the attached page. 
At tae discretion of the Board of Pardons, this decision is subject to review 
a.i.i Tiocificati••*:":• at any tin:*: prior to actual release from enstoiy. 
iJ-i- order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I affix my signature!* DEFENDANT'S 
APPENDIX II 
Rules 613, 801, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Transcript of Steadman Conversation with Police 
Transcript of Inconsistent Trial Testimony 
Rule 613 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 530 
thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made 
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not 
produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make 
any order justice requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution 
elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the 
court in its discretion determines that the interests of justice so require, de-
claring a mistrial. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
generally comports with current Utah practice, rule to make the language gender-neutral. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Necessity of present memory. 
Admissibility of memorandum. . * * " •£«••«»»«» witness lacked indepen-
Necessity of present memory. d e n t knowledge or memory of the value of a 
ring allegedly stolen from him by defendant 
Admissibility of memorandum.
 n o r w a g y, m e m o r y refreshed after looking at When a witness can and does testify to the
 a , ice rt h e ^ n o t al 
facts without resort to a memorandum the
 k n o w l e d o f ^ ri >8 v a l u e ^ h ig tegti. 
T S r S SL ^ ^ " J E S S ? mony concerning it. value was inadmissible, and used to bolster the witness testimony.
 e^ / ^^ °onn ^ni AHA /m u ru A 
State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 f £ * v- °h™'*? « J S M « , S f t I , £ & 
(1957) 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Rule 613. Prior statements of witnesses. 
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement In examining a 
witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or 
not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness 
at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing 
counsel. 
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Ex-
trinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissi-
ble unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same 
and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness 
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not 
apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2). 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is dence (1971). The substance of Subsection (b) 
the federal rule, verbatim. Subsection (a) aban- was formerly in Rule 22(b), Utah Rules of Evi-
dons the position in Queens Case, 129 English dence (1971). 
Reports 976 (1S20), requiring that the cross-ex- Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
aminer, prior to examining a witness about his ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
written statement, must first show the state- rule to make the language gender-neutral, 
ment to the witness and i» comparable to the Cross-References. — Deposition of witness, 
substance of Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Evi- use to impeach witness, Rule 32(a), U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Consistency of statements. testimony. State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 
Subdivision (b) has no application when the (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
prior statement is not inconsistent with trial (Utah 1991). 
Rule 614. Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court 
(a) Calling by court The court may, on its own motion or at the sugges-
tion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine 
witnesses thus called. 
(b) Interrogation by court The court may interrogate witnesses, whether 
called by itself or by a party. 
(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to 
interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportu-
nity when the jury is not present. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Testimony at trial. but this is not mandatory. Merriam v. 
Subdivision (a) provides that a court-ap- Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
pointed expert may be called as a trial witness, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Right of independent expert to re- Right of indigent defendant in state criminal 
fuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50 case to assistance of chemist, toxicologist, tech-
A.L.R.4th 680. nician, narcotics expert, or similar nonmedical 
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal gpecialist in substance analysis, 74 A.L.R.4th 
case to assistance of expert in social attitudes, SSS 
74 A.L.R.4th 330. 
ARTICLE VIII. 
HEARSAY. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an asser-
tion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's 
testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has 
forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of iden-
tification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an 
individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which 
the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement 
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or em-
ployment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection been given under oath or subject to perjury. 
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of The former Utah rules admitted such state-
Evidence (1971). ments as an exception to the hearsay rule. See 
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay respect to confrontation problems under the 
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of tution. Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally pro-
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially mulgated by the United States Supreme Court 
the same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence with the addition of the language "or the wit-
(1971). ness denies having made the statement or has 
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1), forgotten" and is in keeping with the prior 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from Utah rule and the actual effect on most juries, 
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior Subdivision (dXlHB) is in substance the 
statements as substantive evidence if (l)incon- same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
sistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and (1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its 
does not require the prior statement to have interpretation of the applicable rule in this 
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RL: AND WHERE ARE YOU SUPPOSED 
SALTL^9&UN 
GS: AND ALL HE TOLD ME, ALL HE GAVE HE WAS ANeyADJOEESS 
WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE A HUNDRED DOLLARS BY 4:00 DOWN THERE 
RL: WHEN WAS THIS? TODAY? 
GS: TODAY. BUT I COULDN'T. 
RL: YOU WEREN'T ABLE TO GET THERE? 
GS: I DIDN'T, NO, I WASN'T EVEN ABOUT TO TRY TO GET, TO COME UP 
WITH A HUNDRED DOLLARS TO GO PAY FOR 
RL: OH, SO HE WASN'T GOING TO GIVE YOU THE MONEY, HE JUST WANTED 
YOU TO COME UP WITH IT? 
GS: YAH, HE WANTED KE TO COME UP WITH THE MONEY TO GO PAY FOR THIS 
GUN SO THAT IT COULD BE DESTROYED. THAT EVERYTHING WAS ALL 
ARRANGED AND EVERYTHING. THAT'S ALL KE WANTED MS TO DO. 
RL: OKAY, SO DO YOU KNOW THIS/ GUY NAKED JAY, AT ALL? 
GS: NO, I DON'T, BUT I HAVE AN ADDRESS. 
RL: OKAY, WHAT'S THE ADDRESS. 
GS: UK, EDDIE WHERE'S THAT ONE ENVELOPE THAT HAS THE EMPLOYEES 
VISITING HOURS ON IT? I WROTE EVERYTHING DOWN ON THAT. THIS 
IS ALL HE GAVE ME IS "TODAY A HUNDRED DOLLARS, FRIDAY BY 4:00 
PM, THE ADDRESS IS 6611 I 
RL: AND THAT'S IN SALT LAKE? 
GS: COTTONWOOD STREET. 
RL: COTTONWOOD STREET? 
GS: AH-HUH. 
RL: OKAY. 
GS: THAT'S ALL HE GAVE ME. KE DIDN'T GIVE MS HIS PHONE NUMBER, 
NOTHING AND THEN KE GAVE ME 
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RL: YOU'VE NEVER DEALT WITH THIS GUY BEFORE? 
GS: NO, I DON'T KNOW WHO HE IS. 
RL: HOW DID THEY GET THE GUN? YOU DON'T KNOW? 
GS: I DON'T KNOW. 
GS: BUT I'M TELLING YOU THE COMPLETE TRUTH. 
RL: OKAY, WHEN DID YOU FIND OUT, OR WHEN DID COREY TELL YOU THAT 
HE WANTED THIS...INAUDIBLE... 
GS: ON THE PHONE CALL THAT I:E CALLED, HE CALLED ME WEDNESDAY NIGHT 
AND WANTED ME TO TRYING AND GATHER U? MONEY FOR TODAY BY FOUR 
O'CLOCK FOR IT. 
GS: DO YOU KNOW, I KEPT TELLING THEM, CAUSE YOU KNOW, WHEN I ASKED 
COREY WHERE THE GUN WAS 
RL: AH-HUH? 
GS: TKEY HAD ALREADY TOLD ME THAT HE HAD TOLD ME THAT IT WAS TAKEN 
CARS OF. I SAYS, I SAYS, I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT'S AT AND I 
DON'T LIKE THE IDEA OF THIS. I SAYS I'M GOING TO CALL THE GUN 
IN AS MISSING OR WHATEVER. HE SAYS NO, THE GUNS BEEN TAKEN 
CARE OF, DON'T WORRY A30UT IT. 
RL: UM, WHICH PAWN SHOP WAS IT, YOU PURCHASED IT FROM? 
GS: IT WAS DOWN ON STATE STREET IN MIDVALE. 
RL: STATE STREET IN MIDVALE, HUH? YOU DON'T REMEMBER THE NAME OF 
IT? 
GS: I DON'T KNOW THE NAME OF IT. I COULDN'T, YOU KNOW, I KNOW 
EXACTLY WHERE IT'S AT, BUT I DON'T KNOW THE NAME OF IT. 
RL: WAS IT HY AND MIKES? 
GS: YES, IT WAS. 
RL: IT WAS, HUH? 
GS: IT WAS HY AND MIKES. THAT'S THE ONE THAT'S ON STATE AND NOT 
SOTH, BUT A LITTLE FARTHER DOWN TOWARDS FASHION PLACE MALL. 
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RL: TOWARDS FASHION PLACE MALL. OKAY, THAT'S WHERE I THOUGHT... 
GS: YAH. 
RL: UM... 
GS: YAH, BY THE NEW SHOPKO. IS THAT WHAT IT IS? 
RL: I THINK SO, SO IT'S NEAR THE NEW... 
GS: OR PRICE SAVER OR WHATEVER? 
RL: YAH. 
GS: RIGHT THERE. THEY USUALLY HAVE LIKE A LAWN MOWER OR SOMETHING 
OUT FRONT. 
RL: OKAY. 
GS: AND THEN THERE'S A COUPLE, I THINK A CAR SHOP NEXT DOOR ACROSS 
THE STREET. 
RL: NOW DID COREY AND MARK GO IN WITH YOU? 
GS: YES, THEY DID. 
RL: THEY ACTUALLY, DID THEY ACTUALLY PICK OUT THE GUN YOU WANTED? 
GS: THEY PICKED THE GUN OUT. 
RL: CAN YOU REMEMBER WHAT IT LOOKED LIKE? 
GS: IT WAS, IN FACT I KNOW EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS, IT'S A 194 2 COLT, 
3 2 COLT. 
RL: 32? 
GS: AUTOMATIC. 
RL: 3 2 COLT AUTOMATIC? 
GS: AH-HUH. I HAVE NO PAPERWORK ON IT, WHATEVER V7AS GIVEN TO US 
IN THE STORE WAS IN THE SACK AND THEY HAD EVERYTHING. I 
CARRIED THE SACK OUTSIDE AND THEN FROM THERE TO MARK'S HOUSE 
7". .INAUDIBLE. . '""" 
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RL: LISTEN, I'M SORRY, YOU KNOW, THAT, I HAVE A HARD TIKE 
UNDERSTANDING WHY YOU WOULD DO THAT AND NOT BE SOMEWHAT 
SUSPICIOUS AND I WONDER, IS NOT A JURY GOING TO DO THE SAME 
THING? 
GS: BECAUSE I DON'T LIKE GUNS AND I DIDN'T, I WOULDN'T EVEN HOLD 
IT IN THE STORE. 
RL: NO, NO, NO, NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT I'M REFERRING TO, IS WHY DID 
YOU BUY THIS GUN FOR THEM. YOU KNOW, WHY, YOU KNOW, WHY IS IT 
YOU DIDN'T ASK MORE QUESTIONS 
GS: WELL COREY SAID 
RL: BECAUSE WHAT A JURY OR SOMEONE 
GS: EVERY TIME I ASKED QUESTIONS THEY JUST TOLD ME IT WAS BETTER 
OFF IF I DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING. 
RL: I THINK THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO :iAKE ME SAY, HEY NO I 
DON'T THINK I'LL GET INVOLVED, BUT 
GS: I TRIED NOT BUYING THE GUN, BUT THEY, THEY SAID JUST C'KON AND 
LOOK, .AjjPXLS HARftSSIECLXQiL IT WOULD BE BETTER OFF IF YOU HAD 
THE GUN IN THE HOUSE, IN YOUR ROOM WHERE IF SOMETHING HAPPENED 
WHEN I WASN'T AND COREY WASN'T HOME, THEN I WOULD HAVE, YOU 
KNOW, HAVE SOME WAY OF PROTECTING MYSELF. 
RL: BUT YET, THEN THEY DIDN'T EVEN GIVE VOU THE GUN WHEN YOU 
WALKED OUT. 
GS: NO, WE FUT IT IN MARK'S TRUCK IN THE BACK. AND WHEN I GOT 
HOME WE, THEY DROPPED ME OFF AT THE HOUSE CAUSE I HAD TO GO, 
I HAD OTHER APPOINTMENTS THAT DAY. 
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GS: THAT DAY THAT WE BOUGHT IT. 
RL: OKAY, DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT DAY IT WAS? 
GS: UM, I DON'T. I REALLY DON'T. I'M SORRY. 
Ob: u:-l, I THINK HE PAID $300.00. HE PAID THE CASH RIGHT THERE, I 
DIDN'T EVEN TOUCH IT. 
RL: SO DID HE TAKE THE MONEY OUT? 
GS: I DIDN'T EVEN TOUCH ANY OF THE MONEY. 
RL: SO MARK ACTUALLY CAME UP WITH THE MONEY? 
GS: MARK CAME UP WITH THE MONEY AND HANDED IT TO 'EM. 
RL: DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE GUY LOOKED LIKE THAT YOU SOLD IT... 
GS: HE WAS AN OLDER GUY. 
RL: OLDER GUY? 
GS: AH-HUH, AN OLDER GUY. 
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RL: AND HE TOOK THE MONEY FROM MARK, BUT HE USED YOUR DRIVERS 
LICENSE? 
GS: AH-KUH. 
while she is on the stand. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BLAYLOCK: 
Q Glenda, did you ever have any conversation with 
the police about what happened, the purchase of the gun 
and so on? 
A I don't recall it really, any conversations 
with them, except for when they had called the house 
quite a few times and I had returned a couple of phone 
calls to Det. Lloyd. 
Q You did return a phone call to Det. Lloyd? 
A I returned maybe one or two, but he wasn't in 
the office usually when I called, but returned phone 
calls. 
Q Do you recall talking to him on the phone about 
what happened at the pawn shop? 
A When he called me, yes. 
Q Do you recall when that might have been? 
A No, I don't. 
Q Could that have been in March? 
A I didn't move into the house that I am in until 
the 18th of March. He stopped by that house and I think 
that is basically the only time I really talked to him on 
the phone was at the new house the 18th, after the 18th 
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1 of March. I know he had stopped by at the other house a 
2 couple of times and called, but I was never home when he 
3 called the other house. 
4 Q Do you ever recall talking to him on the phone 
5 on the 15th of March? 
6 A No, I don't. 
7 Q Does that mean it could not have occurred? 
8 A No, it does not mean that. I could have 
9 occurred but I don't recall it. 
10 Q Were you proved with a copy of a transcript? 
11 A Yes, I was. 
12 Q Of a conversation on the 15th of March? 
13 A Uh-huh. 
14 Q Have you reviewed that? 
15 A Yes, I have. 
16 Q Do you recall this conversation having taken 
17 place? 
18 A No, I don't. 
19 Q Do you recall any statements you made to him as 
20 to where the gun finally ended up? 
21 A I think when he came by the house, I think the 
22 last couple of times, we had talked about it, where I do 
23 believe it was left in Debbie's apartment. But I am not 
24 sure if that is where it was, if that is where it was 
25 when I moved out for sure. If it is there now or if it 
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is at my mom's or my grandmother's or in the storage. 
Q Do you recall telling Officer Lloyd on the 
phone on the 15th of March that it was left in Mark 
McGrath's truck? 
A No, I don't. Mark never touched the gun. 
Neither did Cory. 
Q Do you recall telling him on the phone that you 
didn't want the gun around, that you were afraid of guns? 
A I don't particularly care for guns, no, I 
don't. But I felt at the time that when I bought the gun 
I needed it for my own safety of my ex-husband. 
Q Do you recall talking to him on the phone about 
a conversation you had with Cory Brooks about getting rid 
of the gun? 
A No, I don't. 
Q You don't recall that at all? 
A No. 
Q Are you saying that it didn't occur or you 
don't recall? 
A I don't recall it occurring. 
Q Could it have occurred? 
A Anything is possible. 
Q Do you recall telling him you didn't see the 
gun after you left the gun in the truck that Mark and 
Cory were in? 
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1 A No, I don't remember telling him that because I 
2 took that with my purse and my jacket upstairs. 
3 I Q You say you took the gun into the house? 
4 A Uh-huh, into Debbie's apartment. 
5 Q Where did you put it from there? 
6 A I sat my jacket and my purse down on the couch. 
7 Debbie came home and honked. I grabbed my purse and my 
8 jacket and I left. 
9 Q Where was the gun? 
10 A Sitting on the couch. Then when we came home, 
11 we had to go get Tera, so we was cleaning the house and I 
12 put that with a bunch of my stuff in her hall closet in a 
13 box, and to this day I cannot find that box. I am still 
14 missing quite a few items that Debbie will not give back. 
15 Q Did you ever show it to Debbie? 
16 A No, I didn't. 
17 Q Ever tell her you had it? 
18 A I don't recall telling her that I went and 
19 bought it. 
20 Q You have any conversation with her about 
21 purchasing that firearm? 
22 A After we had talked about it the first time and 
23 what she told me, she thought it was a really stupid 
24 idea, that was the last that it came up, I had heard her 
25 opinion on it. 
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Q Do you recall a conversation in my office where 
a police officer was present? 
A I remember going to your office, but no one 
else was in the office with us. It was just you and I. 
Q Don't you recall Mr. Wells being present? 
A No, because Det. Wells left and Det. Lloyd sat 
outside. 
Q Do you recall the statements that you made then 
about what happened to the firearm? 
A No, I don't. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, I would have no 
further questions of this witness. 
THE COURT: Mr. Athay. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ATHAY: 
Q Glenda, you had many calls from the police 
department, haven't you? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q Have you ever felt threatened or harassed by 
them? 
A Yes, very. We had asked if there was any way 
we could put a stop to having Det. Lloyd come over and 
whatnot. 
Q Who did you ask? 
A I called Reed Brown. He is a friend of the 
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1 family. 
2 Q Is he a lawyer? 
3 A He is an officer. 
4 Q Police officer? 
5 A Uh-huh, for West Valley. 
6 Q And you spoke with him? 
7 A Uh-huh. He said they shouldn't be allowed to 
8 harass. 
9 Q Tell the jury — 
10 A That it would be best if I got a lawyer. 
11 MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, I think we would 
12 object to the conversations with people who are not 
13 present to be cross examined. It is hearsay. 
14 THE COURT: It is hearsay if it is offered for 
15 the truth of the statement, but I don't know that it is. 
16 MR. ATHAY: It is not. 
17 THE COURT: I didn't think so. I will allow 
18 it. I don't see much relevance to this. 
19 Q (By Mr. Athay) Tell the jury and the Court what 
20 you told Officer Brown about what you felt? 
21 A I had told him ~ 
22 MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, I object on the 
23 grounds of relevance. We don't have any foundation 
24 either. We don't know where this conversation took 
25 place. We don't know when it took place. We don't know 
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who was present. There is no foundation and it is 
irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Athay) You have indicated, you say, you 
felt harassed in this case? 
A Yes, they had came — 
Q Just listen to my question. Who did you feel 
was harassing you? 
A Det. Lloyd and Det. Wells. 
Q And why did you feel they were harassing you? 
A Because I had told them what had happened the 
last time they came around, and I told them that is all I 
had to say. That was everything. And they insisted I 
went to Roger Blaylock's office. I had plans to go out 
of town. They told me it will only be an hour, and we 
left my house before 1:00, and they told me we would only 
be gone an hour. I got home that evening at 4:30. 
Q Were you ever threatened with charges being 
charged against you? 
A Yes. 
Q Unless you provided information to them? 
A They told me if I did not go up to his office 
that I would be issued — they would go get a warrant for 
my arrest. 
Q Did they ever threaten to charge you with any 
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1 crimes in this case? 
2 A He kept telling me they had the subject of a 
3 blond being involved in this case and that they thought 
4 it was me, 
5 Q And did they indicate what they were going to 
6 do unless you provided information? 
7 A They told me that if I didn't go up and talk 
8 with Roger Blaylock, that they would issue the warrant 
9 for my arrest and that they could process me with charges 
10 as being an accessory. 
11 Q Accessory. Did they ever tell you they wanted 
12 you to provide them information about Mark McGrath? 
13 A They asked questions about him. 
14 Q What kinds of questions? 
15 A Who he was, how long him and Cory had been 
16 friends, why he was around my house, what he looks like, 
17 who he dated. 
18 Q Did they ever instruct you you had to tell them 
19 that Mark McGrath someway possessed this gun? 
20 A They told me that Mark was behind the whole 
21 thing; that it wasn't Cory that they wanted. It was 
22 Mark. 
23 Q And what did you tell them in response to that? 
24 MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, I would object as to 
25 "they." 
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THE COURT: "They," then we are getting hearsay 
in. 
THE WITNESS: Det. Lloyd and Det. Wells. 
Q (By Mr. Athay) Was there anybody present 
besides Det. Lloyd and Det. Wells? 
A No, we were standing outside. We have kids at 
the house. I didn't think they needed to be subjected to 
it. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I will object on the grounds of 
foundation. We don't know when. 
MR. ATHAY: That is my next question. 
Q (By Mr. Athay) When did this occur? 
A After they had made me go to his office. 
Q And when was that approximately? 
A It was in the summer. It was nice and warm. 
Q Summer of what year? 
A Last year. 
Q Can you pick a month? 
A I would say it was close to about this month. 
Q About this month? 
A About this month. 
Q First of June? 
A First of June. 
Q Who was present? 
A Me, Det. Wells and Det. Lloyd. 
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1 Q No one else? 
2 A Everybody else was inside of my house. 
3 Q And as a result of that conversation, you felt 
4 threatened? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Did you feel intimidated? 
7 A Yes, I felt like they were trying to scare me. 
8 Q Did you feel harassed? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q As a result of that, you went to Officer Brown; 
11 is that correct? 
12 A Yes, I did. I called my dad and he told me to 
13 come out and we would sit down and talk to Reed Brown. 
14 Q Did you ever call anyone else? 
15 A Then Reed suggested that we get me a lawyer, so 
16 I did. 
17 Q Who was that lawyer? 
18 A David McPhie. 
19 Q Did you ever have occasion to call my office 
20 and complain about your treatment? 
21 A I called a couple of times, I do believe, but 
22 you weren't in. I got your secretary, I believe, a 
23 couple of times. 
24 Q Did you have a conversation with myself and my 
25 secretary about this harassment? 
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A I did talk to you about how — I asked if they 
could make me go. If they could have made me go down 
there without the warrant. 
Q Do you recall when that conversation was, the 
one you had with me and my secretary? 
A I don't recall a month. I know it was last 
year. 
Q Was it after the incident that you have 
described, that with Det. Wells and Det. Lloyd? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Did you advise me you felt harassed, 
intimidated and threatened? 
A Yes. 
MR. ATHAY: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Yes, I do have a couple of quick 
questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED 
BY MR. BLAYLOCK: 
Q Glenda, you said you told them the first time 
what had happened. What did you tell the police had 
happened? 
A I told them that I had went with Cory and Mark, 
and Mark and Cory had drove me down to pick up the gun. 
So I could buy a gun and they dropped me off at Debbie's. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
"T 
Dct:lj,' 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK EDWARD MCGRATH, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 911901762 FS 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant MARK EDWARD MCGRATH, 
is charged by the information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY. The 
Information alleges: 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second Degree Felony, 
at 13371 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on or about January 29, 1991, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, MARK EDWARD MCGRATH, a party to the offense, 
received, retained or disposed of property, aided in concealing, 
selling or withholding the property of Stephanie Vert, knowing 
the property had been stolen, with the purpose to deprive the 
owner thereof, and that at the time of the theft MARK EDWARD 
MCGRATH was armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun, and 
that the value of said property exceeded $1,000.00. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Mark Edward McGrath, 
of the offense of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property as charged 
in the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 29th day of January, 1991, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Mark Edward McGrath, 
received, retained or disposed of the property of another; and 
2. That the defendant knew that said property had been 
stolen or believed that said property had been stolen; and 
3. That the defendant received, retained or disposed of 
said property with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and 
4. That said property had a value that exceeded $1,000.00. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property as charged in the information. If, on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or 
more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
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